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Cyberspace, Ta’ziyeh symbols and the Public Sphere in Iran 
 




The instruments of publicity and public engagement in the social, economic and political arenas 
are growing in power due to the development of communication technology and electronic 
media. At the same time, their capacity to play a manipulative role in forming the public sphere is 
disregarded. Drawing on Victor Turner’s emphasis on the importance of symbols and his 
analyses of liminality, this article focuses on a liminal period in the recent history of Iran, namely 
the 2009 Green Movement, when a ritual performance such as Ta’ziyeh and its symbols played 
key roles in mobilising crowds and forming the public sphere. In this way, it demonstrates how, 
under such liminal conditions, trickster figures can employ cultural and religious symbols in the 
medium of cyberspace, social media and social networks to become influential in manipulating 
the public.  
 




Historical background of the Green Movement 
 
In the aftermath of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death on June 3, 1989, the Assembly of 
Experts elected the president, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, as his successor. After Khamenei’s 
approval, a national referendum was held alongside the presidential elections on July 28, 
1989, to ratify the constitution by the majority of the voters. Thereafter, Khamenei was 
elected as the leader and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was Majlis (the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly) speaker, was elected as the president of Iran by the popular 
majority vote. Initially, these dual power systems co-operated, with the aim of resuming 
collective clerical rule. 
Despite the newly ratified constitution, which gave considerable power to the 
new leader, Khamenei, it was Rafsanjani, a millionaire mullah (cleric), who dominated 
Iranian politics since the 1980s. Among Khomeini’s revolutionary followers, these two 
powerful figures, Khamenei and Rafsanjani, were joint advocates of feqh-e puyā 
(progressive Islamic jurisprudence) (Arjomand, 2009: 37). Regardless of their similarity 
and co-operation, they gradually began to compete for more power and supremacy. In 
this power struggle, they both used any opportunity to enlarge their circle of support and 
sovereignty. For example, Khamenei took advantage of his constitutional privilege to 
have mastery over military forces and upheld his network of clerical commissars in the 
various organisations, public sectors, security and intelligence forces, the Special Court 
for Clerics, and, importantly, the provincial and municipal Friday prayer leaders (Imam 
Jomeh) (ibid: 38). 
Mir Hossein Muosavi (the leading figure of the 2009 Green Movement), who was 
an active member of the 1979 revolution against the King of Iran, served as the prime 
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minister from 1981 to 1989 but, after the constitutional referendum, the post of prime 
minister was abolished, putting the cabinet directly under the president as the head of the 
executive power. Since then, he was the president of the Iranian Academy of Arts. This 
expansion of presidential power helped Rafsanjani to launch economic liberalisation, to 
make his own nominations to key posts and to reduce social and cultural (but not 
political) controls during his presidency from 1989 to 1997. At the time, Rafsanjani 
consciously ignored the surrounding chaos in society, and instead focused on competing 
with the hardliners in order to obtain key positions of power. For example, he and his 
allies excluded radical wings of the opposition from the 1990 elections for the Assembly 
of Experts and also in the 1992 parliamentary elections for their own gain. According to 
Bakhash (2010), even the Iran Liberation Front, which was a centrist opposition party, 
was barely tolerated by Rafsanjani and his circle. 
Rafsanjani’s privatisation and development programme benefited a few, 
particularly those in his circle, but led to inflation and hardship in the wider society, 
which resulted in protests in several places from 1992 to 1995. Together with the steps 
towards cultural liberalisation, which failed to fulfil many of the shortcomings in Iranian 
society, this led to the election of conservatives and hardliner figures in the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. Rafsanjani’s obvious loss of the initiative to the hardliners 
convinced him to use his position and power to encourage and support the election 
campaign of Mohammad Khatami. In the 1997 presidential election, Khatami stimulated 
voters by highlighting the rule of law, tolerance for diverse views, respect for rights and 
improvement of social rights, building good international relations and special attention 
to the needs of women and youth, through applying Shia symbols. Subsequently, he won 
70% of the vote in an 80% turnout. In the 2001 presidential election, his campaign on a 
reform programme won a second term by a similar margin. He followed Rafsanjani’s 
policies for economic liberalisation and privatisation. Under his presidency, a new public 
discourse and vocabularies such as democracy, pluralism, modernism, liberty, equality, 
civil society, human rights, political participation, dialogue and citizenship were included 
in the daily debate in Iranian media (Abrahamian, 2008). 
            After Khatami’s eight-year presidential term, Ahmadinejad, a hardline candidate, 
succeeded in winning the 2005 election. Reformists, led by Rafsanjani, lost the 
presidential election after 16 years governing, but they used all their potential power and 
any possible tricks to win the next election. Against their expectations, however, 
Ahmadinejad won a second term on June 12, 2009. The reformist candidate, Mir 
Hossein Mousavi, who was backed by Rafsanjani and his circle, disputed the result, 
suggesting it was arranged illegally. Subsequently supporters of Mousavi cried foul and 
ultimately clashed with riot police in Tehran, despite a ban on public protests. According 
to news agencies, thousands of supporters of Mousavi, some of whom were wearing his 
campaign colour of green, were chanting ‘where is my vote?’ and ‘down with the 
dictator’. The supreme leader, Khamenei, called for calm, but the crowd continued to 
protest. Subsequently, there were clashes between protesters and the authorities. This 
protest was the starting point of the 2009 Green Movement. Amid an increasing regime 
of censorship, cyberspace use and social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, 
became increasingly popular, particularly among the young. Both sides, the reformists 





and hardliners, employed religious and cultural symbols and images through cyberspace 





Anthropologists such as Turner (1967; 1982) and Schneider (1977) put a substantial 
emphasis on the concept of symbols and their meanings. A system of symbols may be 
understood as defining the culture of a society. In other words, the culture is created, 
developed and maintained by a system of symbols. In Turner’s (1967) words, it is a forest 
of symbols and ‘each symbol expresses many themes, and each theme is expressed by 
many symbols. The cultural weave is made up of symbolic wrap and thematic weft’ 
(1977: 189-190). This intertwining of symbols and themes provides us with significant 
information about the natural environment, as observed and assessed by the ritual actors, 
as well as about their ethical, esthetical, political, legal and ludic ideas, ideals, and rules. 
Accordingly, symbols remain remarkably stable and the themes they represent and 
embody are persistently entrenched. Firstly, they travel from a ritual performance to 
other kinds of ritual, or even transfer from one genre to another, such as transferring 
from a ritual performance to an epic, a narrative, a myth, a speech, a painting, a poster, 
calligraphy, a fairy tale, a social network and even to a case at law. Secondly, they are 
characterised by variability and can be employed both for giving order and creating 
disorder in a society (Turner 1982). Turner extended his theory to give it a wider 
application to social, cultural and political dynamics, arguing that ‘much of the imagery 
found in the rhetoric of politicians is drawn from ritual symbolism, from which it drives 
its power to move and channel emotion’ (Turner, 1977: 194).  
Shia symbols in Iranian culture can create powerful emotions and make a crowd 
laugh, cry and sacrifice, or alternatively to violate rules and hierarchy, destroy, fight, and 
lastly kill or be killed. According to Kamalipour (2010: 62), the use of signs, symbols, and 
the tradition of slogan chanting in the streets during the 2009 Green Movement created a 
revolutionary atmosphere. Similar to the 1979 revolution, demonstrators were chanting 
allah-o-akbar (God is Great), azadi, esteghlal, jomohouri Irani (Freedom, Independence, 
Iranian Republic), and some new slogans were also created, such as ‘where is my vote?’ 
They regularly recalled the symbols used during the 1979 Revolution through their 
protest activities, in both the streets and online (Rauh, 2013: 1316). In relation to the 
chant allah-o-akbar, Manoukian (2010: 246) argues that it makes the distinction between 
religious and secular irrelevant, foregrounding through citation its own history as its 
distinctive message; it finds its force in referencing the revolution as an ongoing event 
rather than as a past that has already ended. As such it was tactically deployed by the 
reformists’ leaders, particularly Rafsanjani. After four years waiting, Rafsanjani wanted his 
selected candidate, Mousavi, to win the 2009 presidential election at any cost.  
Indeed, the 2009 election was a battle and confrontation between Rafsanjani and 
Khamenei and they were using all possible opportunities and tricks to win the battle. 
After being disappointed with the outcome of the election, the reformists’ leaders 
encouraged chanting allah-o-akbar and utilising the 1979 slogans and mottos, hoping that 
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the tactics of 1979 would work again. By reclaiming the revolutionary mottos, slogans, 
rhetoric and history through posters, photographs, slogans, graffiti and other visual and 
artistic activities, the protestors and their online supporters involved in the Green 
Movement tried initially to challenge the outcome of the 2009 presidential election, and 
later the legitimacy of the system. Mousavi and Karroubi, leaders of the Green 
Movement, neither questioned the leadership of Khamenei nor the system itself. They 
also never specified a particular form of democratic reform in Iran. However, utilising 
Shia symbols as a means to demand a re-election process could gather considerable 
crowds in big cities. This led diasporic Iranians, particularly cyberspace activists, to 
exaggerate the aim, size and scope of the movement. For example, in spring 2010, 
Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Ataollah Mohajerani, Akbar Ganji and Abdolali 
Bazargan published online their own manifesto for the Green Movement for 
international use, calling it a ‘reform-movement’ (Soroush et al., 2010).  
For the better understanding of Ta’ziyeh, it is necessary to review briefly the 
historical highlights of its emergence. After the decease of the prophet Muhammad in 
632, Muslims divided gradually into two sects, the Shia and the Sunni (Homayuni 1989). 
While the Shia Muslims believe that the Prophet had identified Ali ibn Abi Talib as his 
successor in public, the Sunni Muslims claimed that the Caliph, or successor of Prophet 
Muhammad, should be elected according to ancient Arabian tribal tradition. Regardless 
of this division of beliefs, Ali did not challenge Abu Bakr or any subsequent caliphs, 
serving as an advisor to them instead. Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali were elected 
caliphs respectively. However, Ali’s position only lasted between 656 A.C. and 661 A.C., 
as he was murdered. Thereafter, Ali’s supporters became followers of his sons Hassan 
and Hussein, who were sons of Ali and his wife Fatima (daughter of Prophet 
Mohammed). Meanwhile Muawiyah, who founded the Umayyad dynasty and became the 
Caliph, started to fight with his son Yazid against Hussein and his followers’ uprising. 
The war between them provided Shia Islam with its initial sacred narratives, which reveal 
how Hussein was killed on the ground of Karbala. These narratives, poems and rituals 
further developed and became part of the current Ashura rituals. Reciting Karbala 
developed gradually and became a form of spiritual theatre and ritual performance; a 
ceremony or tragedy merged with sacrifice, poetry, mourning and self-flagellation called 
Ta’ziyeh.  
Ta’ziyeh, which means literally mourning, is a dramatic form of religious passion 
play and theatrical expression based on the battle of Karbala which is performed annually 
by Shia Muslims to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of 
Prophet Muhammad, an event which is conveyed predominantly through music and 
dramatic narration (Homayuni, 1989; Chelkowski, 1979).  
Ta’ziyeh is performed on the tenth day of Muharram (the first month of the 
Islamic calendar). This day is called ‘Ashura’, which means ‘tenth’. The main 
performance space is simple, blunt and curtain-less. Characteristically, the empty stage in 
Ta’ziyeh represents the uninhabited and deserted plain of Karbala; a basin of water 
represents the Euphrates River; a branch of a tree represents a palm grove; a panjeh (the 
hand/claw) represents the hand of Abbas and five sacred bodies (Mohammad, Ali, 
Fatimah, Hussein and Hassan); and or black flags marked with the name of Imam 





Hussein and/or his family members represent the Shia colours and martyrs’ names in the 
battle of Karbala.  
Historically, symbols of Ta’ziyeh were employed by political actors to manipulate 
the Shia population in Iran. Aghaie (2004: 29) argues that the interaction between the 
Muharram ritual (especially Ta’ziyeh) and politics yielded evidence that the last three 
rulers in Iran, Qajar, Pahlavi and the Islamic regime, used Muharram and Karbala rituals 
and symbols to legitimise their own position. Likewise, Rahimi’s (2012) study of 
Muharram rituals during the Safavid period also provides a depth of understanding of the 
public sphere in Iran during that period. Using historical evidence, he investigates that 
Muharram, which had been publically practiced since the seventh century, became a 
manifestation of state power during the Safavid dynasty, especially during the reign of 
Shah (King) Abbas I (1587-1629) and Shah Safi I (1629-1642). This historical evidence 
demonstrate how political actors and elites manage to use, reshape, reinvent and even 
eliminate rituals in different ways, in pursuit of their own goals, to transform a society, 
such as Iran, into a “theatre state” (carnivalesque celebrations) and to form the public 
sphere.  
 
The delicacy of the public sphere 
 
The concept of the public sphere, as a forum of communication between the state and 
society, was introduced by Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 
the late 1950s and 1960s. It contributes to the modern understanding of democracy and 
rests on the idea of critical-rational debate, speech acts and deliberative process that are 
‘legitimated through a rational pursuit of collective interest, which also implies a fair 
degree of transparence of communication among the actors involved in the process’ 
(Salvatore, 2007: 5). According to Habermas (1989), the public sphere is formed in a 
place where the otherwise private bourgeois come together and engage in rational debate.  
The creation of new cyberspaces led to a novel development of the public 
sphere, which is rooted in normative Habermasian standards of communicative 
rationality, as it moved away from face-to-face debate to public debates through new 
online communication tools. The developments of this cyberspace technology brought 
new opportunities for publicity and public engagement in the social, economic and 
political arenas, and new ways to communicate speedily, to participate online in the 
political debate, to engage in social movements and revolutions and even to organise 
them. Today, we witness the spread of both cyberspace and cyberspace users through the 
whole world. For example, new mobile phones, particularly smartphones, computer 
technologies and cyberspace were used for the first time in history of Iran in 2009 to 
organise protest, report it, discuss and reflect it online nationally and internationally.  
 Habermas’s model of the public sphere was criticised by social scientists such as 
Calhoun (1992) and Barrow (1993), based on Habermas’s failure to acknowledge the 
intricacy and trickiness of the public sphere in terms of its historical and theoretical 
underpinnings. Salvatore (2007: 2) argues that Habermas ‘underplayed the role of 
religious traditions in its formation’. Rahimi (2012: 85-6) referred to Islamic countries, 
where the politicisation of Islam and the Islamicisation of the public sphere contrast with 
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the secularization characteristic of Habermas’s concept of the public sphere. Salvatore 
(2007: 8) highlights that the public sphere as introduced by Habermas ‘is a model based 
on a particular crystallization of the dialectics between inwardness and publicness’.  
 Habermas (1989: 162), in his own arguments about the mass media, depicts his 
awareness of manipulative forms of publicity in certain conditions, but he obviously 
overlooked the role of religious and cultural symbols and images in forming the public 
sphere. Szakolczai (2013) explores this complexity and critiques the Habermassian 
concept of the public sphere in detail. His historical and anthropological studies of the 
public sphere illustrate the manipulative forms taken by publicity. The public sphere can 
be formed by rhetorical discourse, magical and verbal images, metaphoric language, 
comical inversions and theatrical performances.   
The result is that far from being an arena of purely rational debate, the public 
sphere is one where modern communication systems and tools such as media, especially 
social media, are used to juggle and evade the truth or importance of an issue, by raising 
trivial distinctions and objections. Instead of a domain of free and equal interaction 
between citizens, the public sphere can easily become a mere market place with the 
public itself being turned in a market for consumption (ibid). This condition of the 
public sphere increases the ability of political actors and tricksters to manipulate the 
public, usually by employing religious and cultural symbols, and linguistic skills. The 2009 
Green Movement in Iran is a contemporary example of such a transformation of the 
public sphere, illustrating how the symbols of a ritual performance can be utilised by 
modern communication technology to form and transform public discourse. Generally, it 
shows how disregarding of the role of religious and cultural narratives, myths, signs, 
symbols and images in social science, particularly in sociology and anthropology, is a 
serious deficiency on the part of social scientists. 
 
Liminality and Tricksters 
 
Historically, there is evidence of a strong correlation between the public sphere, liminality 
and the trickster. Trickster utilise available communicative methods, especially in liminal 
periods such as revolution, war and crisis, to manipulate the emotions of the public.  
Plato (1997) was the first philosopher who aimed to understand the issues 
surrounding Athenian democracy. In his dialogues in Gorgias (449a- 458b), Plato 
diagnosed the issues that might be provoked by the practice of debate in the public 
arena. Likewise, he identified possible barriers that may be encountered in the public 
sphere. His dialogue The Sophist (231c-240d) demonstrates how the Sophists had used a 
variety of ways, such as their expertise in speech, to claim to know everything. They 
utilised words to trick people into regarding them as teachers, even though they did not 
represent the truth in reality. Therefore, Plato regarded Sophists not only as cheats and 
imitators, but also as experts at manipulation who lured innocent citizens into believing 
the false information they divulged. Thus, the Sophists are “tricksters”, who utilise any 
possible tricks to approach their own aims. Ultimately, Plato’s recognition of the Sophists 
as image-makers and suppliers of false words and beliefs was directly connected with his 
diagnosis of theatrocracy in The Laws. Such a connection between the Sophists and the 
theatre, which is central to Ion and The Symposium, ‘also has strong theatrical aspects - it 





even ends on the note of Socrates discussing the identity of writing tragedies and 
comedies’ (Szakolczai, 2013: 31). 
 In the twentieth century, Radin (1956), in his study of American Indian 
mythology, described the characteristics of trickster. The trickster (or wakdjunkaga in 
Winnebago language, which means “the tricky one”) ‘[…] knows neither good nor evil 
yet he is responsible for both. He possesses no values, moral or social, is at the mercy of 
his passions and appetites, yet through his actions all values come into being’ (ibid: ix). 
He uses ‘force and trickery to obtain all he wants’ (ibid: 156). Recently, Armbrust (2013) 
introduced a trickster figure, Taufiq Ukasha, in his account of the Egyptian Revolution 
of 2011, which is known as the January 25 Revolution, to list the characteristics of a 
trickster in our modern times. In his observation of the rise of Ukasha, from the middle 
of 2011 to the middle of 2012, he describes Ukasha as a ‘little Hitler’: a trickster 
‘seemingly coming from nowhere’, ‘suddenly no longer a laughing-stock’, ‘suddenly 
frighteningly real’. When Armbrust returned to Egypt in 2013, he found himself in an 
Egyptian Weimar, where ‘[v]iolent clashes were occurring every day between supporters 
and opponents of the government’ (ibid: 587). 
The term “liminality” may be understood as characterising the second stage of 
rites of passage (the three stages of which are separation, transition and reincorporation). 
It was initially introduced by the anthropologist Arnold van Gennep (1960) and then 
developed by Turner (1967: 93-111). According to Turner (1982), liminality refers to any 
situation or object being “betwixt” and “between”; a transition period, an inter-structural 
situation and a process involving moving from one stage to the other stage. Thus, 
liminality is a temporary break from the normal, daily and everyday activities. However, if 
this break, rather than being limited in time and space, becomes boundless, then, 
according to Szakolczai (2000), a permanent state of liminality will occur. The term 
“permanent liminality” was developed by Szakolczai (2000) in his book Reflexive Historical 
Sociology to express aspects of social life masked by conventional theories of 
modernisation and democratisation. This term, which may be interpreted as a state of 
permanent uncertainty, helps us to understand what the public sphere is in contemporary 
societies.  
Recently, the concept of liminality and the trickster have been developed 
extensively by Arpad Szakolczai (2000; 2013) and other social scientists, and is 
increasingly applied to different fields within the social sciences. This paper employs 
these concepts to analyse how political actors utilised symbols and images during the 
liminal period of the 2009 Green Movement, to manipulate and control the crowd to 
reach their pre-planned goal. In this way, it demonstrates how they used modern 
communication technology to wangle, fudge and misrepresent citizens consistently.  
Before explaining how cyberspace was employed during the Green Movement to 
manipulate the public, let us examine who Rafsanjani is and why we should consider him 
as a figure who has most characteristics of a trickster. As one of the most powerful 
figures during the first two decades of the Islamic Republic, Rafsanjani played a key role 
in slaughtering, imprisoning and torturing members of opposition political parties, such 
as the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) and Hezbeh Tudeh (the people’s 
party), in the first years following the 1979 revolution. As Eshraghi and Baji (2012) 
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describe, he vanished Abulhassan Banisadr, the first post-revolution president, from the 
scene; he was responsible for executing thousands of political prisoners in the summer of 
1988; he was in charge of the serial murders of Iranian intellectuals in the 1990s; he 
cultivated his reputation as the jack of all trades in the Islamic Republic; he was 
considered the symbol of wealth and corruption in society: and he was the epitome of 
power and ruthlessness. Akbar Ganji, a reformist journalist who, together with others, 
wrote the Green Movement manifesto, outlines in The Red-Robed Eminence and The Grey 
Eminences (Alijenab Sorkhpoosh va Alijenabanen Khakestari, 2000), which is a collection 
of his articles, the details of Rafsanjani’s involvement in the chain murders (ibid).  
At the same time as Rafsanjani was posing as anti-American in Iran, he sided 
with the US-led coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait, helped win freedom for American 
hostages held by Lebanese militia (Bakhash, 2010), and co-operated with the US in order 
to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. He also began implementing his controversial 
development programme to rebuild the damage caused by the war with Iraq. Rafsanjani 
publicised himself everywhere as Sardar-e Sazandegi (Commander of Reconstruction), 
which resulted in greater private sector involvement, large quantities of foreign 
borrowing and therefore external debt, which fuelled corruption. Finally, he was a key 
figure and supporter of the 2009 movement.  
Thousands of protesters of the 2009 movement were arrested, tortured and 
imprisoned; his children were accused and convicted of committing crime and 
corruption; his allies Mousavi and Karroubi are still living under house arrest and 
Khatami faces serious difficulties after the Green Movement; but the 81-year-old 
Rafsanjani still serves in key positions and is active in the political arena. He entered the 
race for the 2010 presidential election, but was disqualified by the Guardian Council. 
While he is still a member of the Assembly of Experts and heads the Expediency 
Council, he continues to seek greater political influence. He ran for the election of the 
Assembly of Experts on February 26, 2016. About one month before the election, on 
January 13, 2016, he uploaded an image of Mohammad Mosaddegh (Iranian popular 
prime minister from 1951 to 1953) and a page of his hand-writing on his website 
(hashemirafsanjani.ir) and social networks such as Instagram. Rafsanjani claimed that, 50 
years ago, after the book Al-ghazyh Al-phelestineh (Issue of Palestine) was translated by him 
in 1964 and published in the most difficult circumstances, Mossadeq, who was under 
house arrest at the time, read it and sent him the message that it would be a pity if this 
book were left unread. Despite Rafsanjani supporting Ayatollah Khomeini, who targeted 
Mossadeq in several speeches, he needed Mossadeq’s name to win the election. As a 
result, Rafsanjani won 15 out of 16 seats in the Tehran voting district. Ousting key 
hardliners, he is assumed to be an influential competitor for the Iran’s next supreme 
leader. He seeks to maximise two things: his power and his wealth. He wants to be the 
supreme leader in Iran: therefore he employs any possible tricks to become the most 
powerful figure in the political arena.   
 
The Green Movement and the battle of cyberspace 
 
The struggle between politico-religious powers in Iran resulted in an intensification of 
liminality within an existing state of permanent liminality. In other words, while Iranian 





society has been living in a state of uncertainty since 1979 (a permanent liminality), the 
2009 Green Movement represented a further intensification of that state. Ta’ziyeh 
symbols were used during the 2009 movement to form the public sphere, but instead of 
the cassette tape, used to spread messages and speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
cyberspace was employed to communicate with the movement’s followers.  
Rahimi (2011) focuses on the role of cyberspace during the 2009 Green 
Movement and argues that, for social movements, especially under a totalitarian system, 
cyberspace provides a social space wherein imaginaries of self and other, resistance and 
power, form ties and connections of interactivity. He describes this connectivity as 
“social affinities” that are disputatious and litigious performances and actions that 
illustrate strong emotions and narratives of protestation against power (ibid). Manoukian 
(2010) concentrates on a video clip of the 2009 Green Movement to analyse the event, 
considering images in relation to their sounds and subjects in relation to the disparate 
effects and sensations that run through them. He argues that ‘investigating the 
relationship between experience and politics in contemporary Iran and elsewhere 
involves diverting the analysis of subject formation to underline the power and 
heterogeneity of sounds, images, words, actions, bodies, and affects, without 
reconstituting them into stable referents or mourning their absence’ (ibid: 239-40). 
Dabashi (2011) sympathises with and dramatizes the Green Movement. Dabashi’s (2005) 
article, ‘Ta’ziyeh as Theatre of Protest’, demonstrates his familiarity with the role of 
Ta’ziyeh ritual and its symbols in Iranian society. However, it seems to me that their 
positive approach is not because of their tendency to Islamic democracy, but is a reaction 
and protest against more than three decades of tyranny in Iran: a sense that anything 
must be better than the current totalitarian regime in Iran, even if a trickster such as 
Rafsanjani leads it.  
During the 2009 presidential election, social media sites such as Twitter, 
YouTube and Facebook, as well as the availability of text messaging and emails, all 
contributed in fabricating a public sphere in Iran. Nonetheless, this could only be 
operated in big cities due to the limited coverage, access and availability of the internet in 
Iran. Therefore, the cyberspace media coverage was disseminated largely among the 
wealthy and middle class minority of the population. The cyberspace war between 
hardliners and reformists appeared to be a modern way of manipulating the public during 
and after the Green Movement. The hardliners created websites and social networks 
called Sabz Alavi (green Alavi2) and Moasesseh-e Sabz Andishan Javan Alavi (Institute for 
Green Thinkers of Alavi) or ‘Sbznt’ websites and they claimed that they have always been 
green, the true followers of the ahl-e bait1 (Prophet Mohammad and his family members) 
(Kamalipour, 2010: 261).  
Images and symbols of Ta’ziyeh were intensified on social networks and social 
media to illustrate and the dichotomy between “right/good” and “wrong/bad”. 
Reformists demonstrated themselves as “right/good” by calling for the public to rise up 
and fight contemporary injustices. In contrast, the hardliners were elucidating the Green 
Movement as “wrong/bad”. Slogans, symbols, signs and rhetoric that both parties 
uploaded on the social media online sites were crucial for understanding the impact of 
their actions, and also provided a means to be able to analyse the Iranian political cultural 
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landscape. Employing the goriz (elusion/escape/breakout) technique, which is a 
technique of improvisatory performance and a mood of play in Iranian theatre in order 
to relate two different events that occurred in past and present times, under the guise of 
the Karbala theme and Ta’zyieh performances evolved into becoming the dominant 
recognisable cyberspace media used in contemporary Shia society in Iran. Computer 
images from design programmes, such as Photoshop, were circulated to thousands of 
people who had access to the internet and new online mobile-phone technologies. 
Indeed, individuals, groups, reformists, hardliners and government agencies, with the aim 
of mobilising crowds, regularly linked contemporary events, movements and actions to 
the battle of Karbala. This way of linking the two events was also central to war films, 
TV series and videos in the post-revolutionary era, such as the late 1980s TV series 
‘Ravayat-e-Fath’ (‘The Story of Conquest’), directed by Sayyed Morteza Aviny. The 
effectiveness of images was correlated with use of the goriz technique, in that there was a 
relationship between images and their impact on audiences.  
Importantly, to mobilise a considerable crowd, one must know how to employ 
the goriz technique properly, at the right time and place. For example, reformists utilised 
Ta’ziyeh symbols during Muharram ceremonies when the cleric Hussein Ali Montazeri 
died on December 19, 2009, on the third day of Muharram. Montazeri was deputy leader 
to the 1979 revolution’s Supreme Leader, Khomeini, and was once the designated 
successor to him. However, a disagreement over governmental policies led to the 
breakdown of this relationship in 1989. In 2009, he was procured ‘as a symbolic leader of 
the green movement owing to his public censure of the regime’s violent suppression of 
the opposition’ (Rauh, 2013: 1335). In Iran, a funeral ceremony is held on the third, the 
seventh and 40th day after the death. Therefore, thousands of people gathered in Qom 
city to attend Montazeri’s funeral, followed by mourning ceremonies on the day of 
Ashura. This day was the key day for the leaders of the 2009 Green Movement. To be 
able to gather a considerable crowd for protests against the hardliners, they tried to use 
similar methods to the 1979 revolution, to employ the goriz technique at the right time 
and right place.  
Despite that, people were making discourteous jokes about Montazeri for many 
years after the revolution, classifying him as an unwise, senseless and ridiculous cleric, 
nicknaming him Gorbeh Nareh (‘the Tomcat’) (Sciolino, 2000: 191). Nonetheless, now 
Montazeri was being treated with the same esteem as Imam Hussein. At his funeral 
ceremony, he was being called Montazeri-ye mazlum (‘Montazeri, the oppressed one’), and 
the crowd chanted ‘Ya Hazrat-e Masumeh! Montazeri Masumeh!’ (‘oh holiness Masumeh 
(Fatima), Montazeri is innocent’). According Montazeri, the epithet ‘the pure soul’ was 
usually reserved for the Imams (Fischer, 2010: 502). Hazrat-e Masumeh (790-816 AD) is 
the sister of ‘Imam Reza’ (766-819 AD) and the daughter of the seventh Twelver Shia 
Imam ‘Musa Kazim’ (745-799 AD). Her shrine is the physical and spiritual centre of 
Qom city, and one of the most important Shia shrines in Iran. The word Hazrat means 
holiness/majesty/honour/excellency and the word Masum means 
innocent/sinless/immaculate. Thus, a translation of ‘Montazeri-e Masum’ would be 
‘Montazeri the innocent’ and ‘Montazeri Masumeh’ would be ‘Montazeri is innocent’. 
Together, the strength of this funeral and Ashura protests around the nation reflected in 
their slogans and images, by utilising similar goriz techniques, being copied, recorded and 





uploaded on social media and networks such as YouTube, Facebook, blogs, websites and 
online news.   
 
 
Neda, a mixed identity in cyberspace 
 
The death of Neda Agha Soltan was probably the most disturbing and influential image 
that was reported and circulated online. However, there have been conflicting stories 
about her death. Some reported that Neda was shot from the rooftop of a building, as 
she was walking with her music teacher, whilst merely observing a street demonstration 
in Tehran on June 20, 2009. A medical doctor who was nearby put his hands on her 
chest to stop the bleeding, but Neda died immediately (Fischer, 2010). Alternative 
reports suggested Neda was killed by sniper fire on her way home when she briefly 
stepped out of a car to see why the crowd blocked the route (Naghibi, 2011). In any case, 
Neda’s story helps us to explicitly understand how the public sphere could be formed 
and how the public could be manipulated through modern communications technology. 
A mobile video of Neda’s death scene was instantly circulated and ‘Neda’s image moved 
from the grainy mobile video to artistic experiments in a variety of media: painting, 
sculpture, cartoons, a slide show, and collage’ (Lotfalian, 2013: 1378). Subsequently, her 
death became an image associated with the 2009 Green Movement. Iranians living 
abroad actively circulated her images online in the immediate aftermath. The word Neda 
simply means ‘voice’ or, in a gnostic sense, ‘call’ or, alternatively, ‘divine message’ 
(Fischer, 2010: 509). This quickly became the cry, voice and call of the protesters and 
online activists who were supporting the Green Movement. The chant became ‘Neda-ye 
ma namordeh, in dolat-e ke morde’ (‘our Neda [our voice/cry], is not dead, the government is 
dead’).  
To frustrate the claims of reformists, the government blamed American agents or 
other parties for killing Neda, while also trying to declare Neda a martyr of the regime. 
Sohrab Arabi was also killed that day. Sohrab is the name of the famous hero in the 
national epic, the Shahnameh, who was killed unwittingly by Rostam, his father. Neda and 
Sohrab have become an iconic and symbolic pair who represent the Green Movement 
(ibid). Neda’s death video became immediately the most popular video of the Green 
Movement on YouTube. ‘Cable news stations played the footage of Neda’s death on a 
loop, always with the caveat that what we were about to watch [again and then again] was 
extremely disturbing’ (Naghibi, 2011: 61). 
While acknowledging that Neda’s death was a tragedy and a sad occurrence, we 
cannot omit the embedded political theatre and the use of goriz techniques for forming 
the public sphere. In fact, by romanticising, idealising, exaggerating and manipulating the 
footage of her dying, national and international political actors utilised it as a political 
tool to manipulate people’s emotional responses to the protests in Iran. According to 
Naghibi (2011), Neda’s involvement in political activities was indistinct: some reported 
her an innocent bystander, while others suggested that she had started becoming 
interested in politics and regularly attended Green Movement demonstrations. 
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Regardless, Neda’s image and portrait was printed and circulated online to present her as 
a hero and martyr of the 2009 protest rally. 
The spread of these images, veiled and unveiled, resulted in an outpouring of 
emotion from people across the globe, and ‘the feelings of horror, grief, and compassion 
for Neda’s death were transmitted through social media networking sites like Facebook 
and Twitter, and eventually through traditional news media outlets’ (ibid: 61). 
Consequently, Neda’s death sparked protests all over the world. Now, as cynical as it may 
be, the political actors had an innocent victim to use for their own agenda, and to evoke 
the emotion of the public.  
In this way another young woman, Neda Soltani – originally identified as Neda 
Agha Soltan – became the face of the Green Movement, although she was still alive (see 
Figure 1). On October 2, 2012, at 01:32 GMT, Neda Soltani, who was a university 
lecturer in Iran, was interviewed by the BBC World Service. She explained that her photo 
was taken from her Facebook page, which then quickly became a fixed image of the 
protest movement (see Figure 1 and 2). Naghibi (2011) had already explained in his 
writings this mixed identity of Neda as utilised during the Green Movement, but it was 
the first time that Neda Soltani’s voice was broadcasted directly from the BBC. Later, the 
full story was analysed and edited by Phil Coomes and published in the BBC Magazine 
on November 14, 2012. 
In Neda Soltani’s own words, the international media was using a picture of her, 
which was taken from her Facebook account, to accompany the footage of Neda Agha-
Soltan’s death. In fact, she had contacted several international journalists and explained 
that the use of her image was a mistake. She explained that she was not the person who 
had been shot dead. Disappointingly, the journalists who received her message did not 
react and her picture continued to be used. Indeed, CNN, Fox News and social media 
sites propagated the footage of someone who was being victimised by the use of her 
personal image without her consent. Their claim that she was killed by the Islamic regime 
during the protest was false, but seemingly it was too complicated for the public to 
realise that the person present in the image was still alive, or that Neda Soltani’s photo 
was being used instead of that of the real victim, Neda Agha Soltan. Neda Soltani’s 
victimisation continued as journalists persisted in spreading her images through social 
media and networks. Consequently, her photo was used by demonstrators (see Figure 2) 
and ‘many people used her image as their Facebook avatars, and her photo remained 
online in some places as the face of resistance and the green movement’ (Naghibi, 2011: 
62). To complicate matters, Neda Soltani asked people to delete all of her photos and 
images off their websites, Facebook and cyberspace in general, as they were being 
wrongly used, but in return, she received plenty of hate messages. People accused her of 
being an agent of the Islamic regime in Iran, who had unlawfully gained access to Neda’s 
Facebook account and wished to distort the face of their hero, the iconic symbol of 
resistance and opposition. In 2012, when the BBC interviewed her, she held the media 
and social networks responsible for the troubles and difficulties she had and explained 
how she fled to Germany, fearful for her life, and later she secured a US university 
fellowship. 
In the meantime, Neda’s bloodied face over a green background became a 
popular Facebook avatar. As Naghibi (2011) observed, many diasporic Iranians also 





added Neda as their middle name on their Facebook profiles. Many of their websites 
changed their headline to ‘we are all Neda’ or simply to ‘we are Neda’, a forum where 
people could post comments and mourn her death. Neda’s death and story also resulted 
in a short YouTube video, entitled ‘I am Neda’, as well as an award-winning movie made 
by Nicole Kian Sadighi called ‘I am Neda’, which became a finalist in the 2012 Cannes 
Film Festival’s American Pavilion. 
The articles, paintings, films, narratives, videos, blogs, websites and interviews 
romanticised Neda’s youth and beauty. Her images were titled ‘hero martyr’ and ‘angel of 
freedom’. In this way, circulating her images all over the world and demonstrating her 
desire for freedom and democracy formed a public sphere, particularly online, against the 
Islamic regime in Iran. As Figure 2 illustrates, people were believing, mimicking and 
following each other very quickly, even subconsciously. They embraced the culture of the 
crowd, without knowing whether its agenda, task, operation or mission were true or 
false. Likewise, they followed the signs and images the crowd carried, as they believed in 
the crowd, and could not see the hidden agenda of the trickster who manipulated it. 
Demonstrators did not know who Neda was, whether she was killed or not, or who was 
responsible for murdering her. In fact, they were carrying Neda Soltani’s photo, who was 
still alive, wrongly considering her a martyr and chanting ‘Neda did not die in vain’ (see 
Figure 2).  
 
The Green Movement and the formation of the public sphere 
 
In the Ta’ziyeh play, performers who wear green dresses or any green attire are classed as 
playing Imam Hussein and his followers, while players dressed in red are identified as the 
opposing side (Yazid and his army). Thus, in Shia religion, red attire symbolises blood, 
evil, badness and oppression. However, in contrast, the colour green symbolises 
goodness and the garden of paradise. Mir Hossein Mousavi employed the green colour 
of Ta’ziyeh in order to mobilise a considerable crowd for the 2009 Iranian Green 
Movement. Subsequently, new communication tools were used to spread these symbols 
and images during the protests. Technology in all its forms was utilised, such as internet 
campaigns, mobile phone messaging and the use of social networks. In this way, 
‘Mousavi’s revival of the paradigm was an act of proliferation and subversion of religious 
symbols’ (Lotfalian, 2013: 1381), especially Ta’ziyeh symbols.  
In Shia traditions, ahl-e bait (Prophet Mohammad and his family members) are 
symbolised by a handprint called panjeh or panja (palm of hand). The mourners carry 
panjeh while it is connected to the top of various implements, such as alams (the metal 
standards carried in 10 days of Muharram) and flags, to symbolise the battle of Karbala 
during the mourning processions of Ashura and the Ta’ziyeh performance. A similar 
image was illustrated on a small poster held up by a female protestor (see Figure 3). This 
image is representative of the panjeh. The middle fingers are coloured green, and the palm 
illustrated by the calligraphy ‘Ya Hussein’ (oh Hussein) across its diameter. This poster 
aimed to relate the Green Movement to ahl-e bait, particularly to Imam Hussein and the 
Karbala tragedy, as it is performed in Ta’ziyeh. 
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Mousavi and his wife’s use of the green colour in their 2009 presidential election 
campaign was very strategic. It is the colour of Islam associated with ahl-e bait, particularly 
with Imam Hussein, and it also is one of the three colours of the Iranian flag. Thus, the 
panjeh poster in Figure 3, indicating a green colour V, reflects both the Green 
Movement’s associations with the prophetic family, Shia faith and martyrdom of 
Hussein, and with its optimism about victory. As Rauh (2013: 1322 and 1338) illustrates 
and outlines, the panjeh poster that was modified with a V and ‘Ya Hussein’ in Figure 3 
was separated and impaled with an arrow passing through an arm, as well as an alam to 
illustrate the digital logo of the Green Movement (see Figure 4). These two green right 
hands, where blood is seen dropping from the disconnected part of the arms, is intended 
to relate Mir Hossein Mousavi to Imam Hussein, incorporating the phrase ‘Ya Hussein, 
Mir Hossein’, below the hands. The logo is designed to symbolise the Green Movement 
so that it is a continued acknowledgement of Imam Hussein. In both Figures 3 and 4, 
Ta’ziyeh symbols and the goriz techniques are used to relate current problems to a past 
event. The arrows represent pain, suffering and injustice, and show that reformists and 
the Green Movement supporters are in the same situation as Imam Hussein and his 
followers were in the seventh century. Mousavi and his circles adapted these Ta’ziyeh 
symbols and images to legitimise their religious and political positions, similar to the 1979 
Revolution. 
The Green Movement supporters digitalised and modified Ta’ziyeh images and 
symbols by modern computer software and subsequently published them online. For 
example, images created by Deghati (2009) were uploaded as YouTube video clips by 
Akkasbashi to link the tragedy of Karbala to the 2009 protest, using the goriz technique. 
Figure 5 is a screenshot of one of these images, which illustrates the battle of Karbala 
amalgamated with the situation at the time. According to Lotfalian (2013), the original 
version of the image, which is taken from a popular nineteenth century portrait of Imam 
Hussein’s family in Karbala, illustrates the tents, family and Zuljanah (Imam Hussein’s 
horse) to exhibit the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. However, in Figure 5, the landscape 
to the right of Zuljanah has been manipulated to illustrate the forces of the regime 
attacking protesters in Tehran during the 2009 Green Movement. Likewise, the female 
faces are manipulated in order to represent the face of Neda, who was killed during the 
demonstration. In this way, the social media also adds to the translation of the image and 
the intended message. Compellingly, in the YouTube video, the details of this image and 
other images are displayed while mournful music can be heard in the background. The 
music of choice is called nohe, which is more commonly associated with mourning during 
Muharram and the day of Ashura when Ta’ziyeh is played out. 
 
Living in permanent liminality 
 
Many reformists predicted the end of the current Islamic regime by the anniversary of 
the 1979 Islamic revolution on February 11, 2010. However, at the end, after the day of 
Ashura, the regime declared victory over the Green Movement leaders, calling them 
fetnehgaran (seditionists). After overcoming the movement, the regime put the leaders of 
the Green Movement under house arrest and imprisoned anti-regime activists. Since 
then, there has not been another Green Movement demonstration, but Ta’ziyeh symbols 





continue to be frequently and consistently used to benefit political actors and tricksters, 
which maintains the society in a state of permanent liminality. For example, similar 
Ta’ziyeh symbols were used during the seizure of the British embassy and its diplomatic 
compound in Tehran on November 29, 2011.   
In modern democratic societies, the “public” or “people” is the main instrument 
of political actors. Through this mechanism, political tricksters design their actions and 
utilise images, symbols and signs to claim to represent the public will and desire and/or 
to transform the public sphere. In contrast, in Shia societies, such as Iran, the public’s 
interest is often subordinate to the interest of the Shia religion. Therefore, the focal tools 
of political actors for forming the public sphere are Shia religious narratives, symbols, 
images and signs mixed with patriotic icons. The 2009 Green Movement was a 
consequence of the schism occurring between two tricksters, Khamenei and Rafsanjani. 
The ability of such tricksters in utilising cultural and religious symbols is potentially 
dangerous. In the twentieth century, we have already experienced the operations of these 
type of tricksters, such as Nazis, Stalinists and fascists, who employed symbols, images, 
signs, narratives, words and rhetorical skills to transform the public sphere and 
manipulate the entire population to reach their goals.  
In our contemporary world, we witness many different faces of the trickster 
which nonetheless have similar characteristics. War, revolutions and popular movements 
in the Middle East have brought into existence new tricksters. Rafsanjani in Iran and 
Ukasha in Egypt are just two examples. We can find more trickster figures in the liminal 
time of the so-called Arab Spring, which was a series of uprisings and armed rebellions 
started in 2011 and which used cyberspace and modern communication technology to 
spread their message and activities, and for organising protests. As explained, in liminal 
conditions, tricksters employ symbols and interpret them to manipulate the occasion and 
present themselves as a human saviour, as compassionate leaders of the suffering people, 
and as sympathetic to the population. The tragic consequences of such hypocrisy and 
imposture are poverty, desolation, mass murder, ravage and chaos in society. A new 
example of a trickster figure in the Middle East is the self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, who is the leader of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and utilises 
Islamic symbols, images and narratives through cyberspace, social media and social 
networks to attract followers from the whole world, even from the West. He has thereby 
formed an army to kill everyone who does not follow his faith. Modern electronic media 
and communication technology facilitate such tricksters to act and operate at both the 
national and international level. Their actions create reactions which can gradually build 
walls between tribes, groups, and nations. The recent Islamic State attacks in Paris and 
Brussels, and the current conflict between Shia and Sunni, are two examples for growing 
tensions and barriers, which are signs of a permanent liminality.     
 
Conclusion 
   
In the 2009 Green Movement, political actors utilised the goriz technique through 
cyberspace to form the public sphere and gain support for their agenda. This 
demonstrates that modern communication technology enables political actors and 
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tricksters to sell to the public anything they want more quickly than ever before. They are 
able to generate emotions and to shape the public’s perception during periods of 
liminality. This ability of political actors or tricksters is potentially dangerous: indeed, 
through modern communication systems and tools, they can push a society into a state 
of permanent liminality. Clearly, human behaviour, action and reactions are not based 
only on rationality, and they can be corrupted by evoking emotions. Second, religious 
and cultural symbols play a key role in forming the public sphere. Third, the cyberspace 
innovations, which speed up the circulation of news, information and messages, are 
increasingly becoming tools for tricksters and political actors to manipulate and corrupt 
the system. This leads us to conclude that we do not need further cyberspace and 
technological innovation, instead we need to pause and should use the current 
communication technology to build trust and certainty, and to help our society to return 
to the most basic human values. This may help us to reduce tricksters’ ability to 





1 ahl al-bayt in Arabic. 
2 It is a branch of Shia Islam and the term Alavi Shia or Alawite Shi’ism denote the religion of the 
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Figure 1: Mixed Nedas. 
 
 Neda Soltani     Neda Agha-Soltan  
Source: BBC News Magazine (November 14, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 2: Protesters wrongly carrying photos of Neda Soltani, who is still alive. 
 
Source: BBC News Magazine (November 14, 2012) 
 





Figure 3: Panjeh poster in Muharram protests during Montazeri’s funeral. Qom, 
December 21, 2009 
 
Source: Rauh (2013: 1317) 
 
 
Figure 4: The 2009 Green Movement digital logo, combining the panjah, V, arrow, and 
invocation ‘Ya Hussein, Mir Hossein’. 
 
Source: Rauh (2013: 1338) 
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Figure 5: Neda of Ashura 
 
Source: Deghati (2009) 
 
 
 
 
